Rod Blagojevich, brother, and top aides indicted on federal corruption charges

Editor's Note: This is the full text of a press release put out by the Department of Justice today.

CHICAGO
– Since 2002, even before he was first elected governor that November,
and continuing until he was arrested on Dec. 9, 2008, former Illinois [1]
Gov. Rod R. Blagojevich [2]
and a circle of his closest aides and advisors allegedly engaged in a
wide-ranging scheme to deprive the people of Illinois of honest
government, according to a 19-count indictment returned today by a
federal grand jury. Blagojevich, 52, of Chicago, was charged with 16
felony counts, including racketeering conspiracy, wire fraud, extortion
conspiracy, attempted extortion and making false statements to federal
agents. He allegedly used his office in numerous matters involving
state appointments, business, legislation and pension fund investments
to seek or obtain such financial benefits as money, campaign
contributions, and employment for himself and others, in exchange for
official actions, including trying to leverage his authority to appoint
a United States Senator, announced Patrick J. Fitzgerald, United States
Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois.

Also charged as co-defendants in the same indictment are:

John Harris,
47, of Chicago, Blagojevich’s chief of staff from late 2005 until last
December after he was arrested along with Blagojevich. Through his
attorney, Harris, who is charged with a single count of wire fraud, has
authorized the Government to disclose that he has agreed to cooperate
with the United States Attorney’s Office in the prosecution of this
case;

Alonzo Monk,
50, of Park Ridge, a lobbyist doing business as AM3 Consulting, Ltd.,
and a long-time Blagojevich associate who served as his general counsel
when Blagojevich represented Illinois’ Fifth Congressional District,
and later managed his 2002 and 2006 gubernatorial campaigns, was his
first gubernatorial chief of staff from 2003 through 2005, and later
chairman of his campaign fund;

Robert Blagojevich, 53, of Nashville, Tenn., Blagojevich’s brother, who became chairman of his campaign fund in August 2008;

Christopher Kelly,
50, of Burr Ridge, a businessman and a principal campaign fundraiser
who also served as chairman of Blagojevich’s campaign fund from early
2004 until August 2005. The indictment alleges that with Blagojevich’s
knowledge and permission, Kelly at times exercised substantial
influence over certain activities of the governor’s office; and

William F. Cellini, Sr.,
74, of Springfield, a businessman who also raised significant funds for
Blagojevich, in part through his role as the executive director of the
Illinois Asphalt Pavement Association. Cellini had longstanding
relationships and influence with trustees and staff members of the
Teachers Retirement System of Illinois (TRS), and he was associated
with Commonwealth Realty Advisors, a real estate asset management firm
that invested hundreds of millions of dollars on behalf of TRS, the
indictment alleges.

All
six defendants will be arraigned on dates yet to be determined before
U.S. District Judge James B. Zagel in Federal Court in Chicago.
Blagojevich was charged with 11 counts of wire fraud, two counts of
attempted extortion, and one count each of racketeering conspiracy,
extortion conspiracy, and making false statements. The specific counts
and maximum penalties each defendant is facing are listed separately.

The charges are part of Operation Board Games, a continuing
public corruption investigation of pay-to-play schemes, including
insider-dealing, influence-peddling and kickbacks involving private
interests and public duties. The investigation began in 2003 and has
resulted in charges against a total of 17 defendants. Today’s charges
were brought in a superseding indictment that replaces one brought Oct.
30, 2008, against Cellini alone for allegedly conspiring with others to
obtain campaign funds for Blagojevich by shaking down an investment
firm that was seeking a $220 million allocation from TRS.

Mr.
Fitzgerald announced the indictment with Robert D. Grant, Special
Agent-in-Charge of the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; Alvin Patton, Special Agent-in-Charge of the Internal
Revenue Service Criminal Investigation Division in Chicago; Thomas P.
Brady, Inspector-in-Charge of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service in
Chicago; and James Vanderberg, Regional Inspector-in-Charge of the U.S.
Department of Labor Office of Inspector General.

The
indictment adds several new allegations to those that were lodged in
the criminal complaint filed in December when Blagojevich and Harris
were arrested. It includes the previous factual allegations that
Blagojevich conspired to sell or trade Illinois’ U.S. Senate seat
formerly held by President Obama; threatened to withhold substantial
state assistance to the Tribune Company in connection with the sale of
Wrigley Field to induce the firing of Chicago Tribune editorial
board members sharply critical of Blagojevich; and schemed to obtain
campaign contributions in exchange for official actions – both
historically and in a push late last year before a new state ethics law
took effect.

Among the new factual allegations are that:

• beginning
  in 2002 and continuing after Blagojevich was first elected governor,
  Blagojevich and Monk, along with Kelly and previously convicted
  co-schemer Antoin “Tony” Rezko, agreed that they would use the offices
  of governor and chief of staff for financial gain, which would be
  divided among them with the understanding that the money would be
  distributed after Blagojevich left public office;
  in
  2003, Blagojevich, Monk, Kelly, Rezko and other co-schemers implemented
  this agreement by directing lucrative state business relating to the
  refinancing of billions of dollars in State of Illinois Pension
  Obligation Bonds to a company whose lobbyist agreed to provide hundreds
  of thousands of dollars to Rezko out of the fee the lobbyist would
  collect, and Rezko in turn agreed to split the money with Blagojevich,
  Monk and Kelly;
  After
  it became public that Kelly and Rezko were under investigation and
  ceased playing a significant role in raising campaign funds,
  Blagojevich personally continued to trade his actions as governor for
  personal benefits, including, for example, delaying a state grant to a
  publicly-supported school while trying to leverage a U.S. Congressman,
  who supported the school, or the Congressman’s brother, to hold a
  campaign fundraiser for Blagojevich; and
  in
  an interview on March 16, 2005, Blagojevich lied to FBI agents when he
  said that he maintains a separation, or firewall, between politics and
  state business; and he does not track, or want to know, who contributes
  to him or how much they are contributing to him.

  In
  the spring of 2003, Kelly Rezko, Cellini, and Levine agreed that Kelly
  and Rezko would use their influence with the Blagojevich administration
  to assist Cellini and Levine in maintaining influence over the
  activities of TRS, and in return, Cellini and Levine would use their
  influence to cause TRS to invest in funds, and to use law firms,
  selected by Kelly and Rezko, at times in exchange for substantial
  contributions to Friends of Blagojevich.

  In
  late 2002, Ali Ata, a businessman who previously pleaded guilty and is
  cooperating, and who was solicited by Rezko to make political
  contributions to Blagojevich, brought a $25,000 check to Rezko’s
  offices, where Ata met with Blagojevich. Blagojevich asked Rezko if
  Rezko had talked to Ata about positions in the administration, and
  Rezko said that he had. In July 2003, after discussions with Rezko
  about possible state appointments, Ata gave Rezko another $25,000 check
  payable to Blagojevich’s campaign. Ata then had a conversation with
  Blagojevich at a fundraising event in which Blagojevich indicated that
  he was aware Ata recently had made another substantial contribution to
  his campaign, and told Ata that he understood Ata would be joining his
  administration. Ata replied that he was considering taking a position,
  and Blagojevich said that it had better be a job where Ata could make
  some money. Blagojevich ultimately appointed Ata as the executive
  director of the Illinois Finance Authority.

  On
  Oct. 29, 2003, Joseph Cari, then a Chicago lawyer and a national
  Democratic fundraiser who has also pleaded guilty and is cooperating,
  was traveling on a plane with Blagojevich, Kelly and Levine to a
  Blagojevich fundraiser that Cari hosted in New York. Cari and
  Blagojevich spoke about Cari’s fundraising background and Blagojevich’s
  interest in running for President. Blagojevich said it was easier for
  governors to solicit campaign contributions because of their ability to
  award contracts and give legal work, consulting work, and investment
  banking work to campaign contributors, and that Kelly and Rezko were
  his point people in raising campaign contributions. Blagojevich said
  that Rezko and Kelly would follow up with Cari about this discussion.

  On
  March 5, 2004, Cari met with Kelly, who said he was following up on
  Cari’s conversations with Blagojevich, Rezko and Levine. Kelly asked
  for Cari’s help in raising money on a national level for Blagojevich.
  When Cari said he was not inclined to help, Kelly pushed Cari to assist
  and said that helping Blagojevich would be good for Cari’s business
  interests and that Cari could have whatever Cari wanted if he agreed to
  help.

  In
  March 2004, Lobbyist A met with Kelly to ask how two of Lobbyist A’s
  clients could become eligible to manage investments for TRS. Kelly
  told Lobbyist A that TRS was Rezko’s area, and later told Lobbyist A
  that he had spoken with Rezko, and that it would require a $50,000
  campaign contribution to Blagojevich for a firm to get on TRS’s list of
  recommended fund managers.

  In
  April 2004, Levine, Rezko and Kelly agreed that unless Capri Capital or
  one of its principals, Thomas Rosenberg, arranged to raise or make
  significant political contributions for Blagojevich, Capri Capital
  would not receive a proposed $220 million investment from TRS. They
  further agreed that Cellini would deliver that message to Rosenberg.

  In
  early May 2004, Levine advised Cellini of the plan, which Cellini
  assisted by indicating to Rosenberg that Capri Capital had not yet
  received its $220 million allocation from TRS because of its failure to
  make political donations to Blagojevich. After Rosenberg told Cellini
  that Rosenberg would not be extorted and he threatened to expose the
  attempt by informing law enforcement, Cellini ensured that Kelly, Rezko
  and Levine learned about Rosenberg’s threat.

  On
  May 11, 2004, Cellini, Levine, Rezko and Kelly agreed that in light of
  Rosenberg’s threat to expose the extortion attempt, it was too risky to
  continue demanding money from him or to block the $220 million
  allocation to Capri Capital. They agreed that although Capri Capital
  would receive the $220 million allocation, it would not receive any
  further business from any state entity, including TRS. After the
  discussion, Cellini and Levine took steps to conceal the extortion
  plan, including using their influence and Levine’s position at TRS to
  ensure that Capri Capital received its $220 million allocation.

  (A
  separate fraud conspiracy count against Kelly and Cellini alleges that
  in the summer of 2004, they discussed with Rezko and others moving TRS
  Staffer A - the Executive Director of TRS – to another job with a
  different state entity to ensure that he would not cooperate with law
  enforcement. And, in the summer and fall of 2004, Cellini, Rezko and
  others allegedly discussed the possibility of removing the U.S.
  Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois to stop the
  investigation.)

  Rezko
  told Cellini and Levine, in separate conversations, that Blagojevich
  had been told about the attempt to extort Rosenberg, and Blagojevich
  had said that Rosenberg meant nothing to him.

  To
  ensure that Blagojevich and Monk continued to give Rezko substantial
  influence regarding appointments to boards and commissions, hiring for
  state employment, and the awarding of state contracts, grants, and
  investment fund allocations, Rezko gave certain benefits to Blagojevich
  and Monk including the following:

  in
  late August 2003, Rezko directed to Blagojevich’s wife a payment of
  $14,396 in connection with a real estate transaction involving
  property at 850 North Ogden Ave., Chicago, even though Blagojevich’s
  wife had not performed any services;
  from
  approximately October 2003 to May 2004, Rezko, through his real estate
  development company, gave Blagojevich’s wife payments of $12,000 a
  month, purportedly for real estate brokerage services;
  in
  January 2004, Rezko directed to Blagojevich’s wife a payment of $40,000
  purportedly for brokerage services in connection with the sale of
  property at 1101 West Lake St., Chicago, even though Blagojevich’s wife
  had provided few, if any, services relating to that sale; and
  from
  the spring of 2004 until 2006, Rezko provided to Monk a number of
  $10,000 cash gifts to pay for various items, such as a car and home
  improvements, totaling approximately $70,000 to $90,000.

  After
  Blagojevich’s wife’s real estate business became the subject of
  critical media coverage, Blagojevich directed Harris to try to find a
  paid state board appointment or position for her. During several
  conversations in early 2008, Blagojevich informed Harris that he wanted
  his wife put on the Pollution Control Board, which pays salaries to its
  board members. When Harris told Blagojevich that his wife was not
  qualified for the position, Blagojevich told him to find other
  employment for his wife.

  In
  the spring of 2008, around the time that Blagojevich’s wife passed a
  licensing exam that allowed her to sell financial securities,
  Blagojevich asked Harris and others to set up informational or
  networking meetings for his wife with financial institutions that had
  business with the state in hopes that those businesses would assist in
  getting his wife a job. Harris later arranged meetings between
  Blagojevich’s wife and officials at two financial institutions that had
  business with the state. When Blagojevich concluded that officials at
  these institutions were unhelpful in finding his wife a job, he told
  Harris that he did not want the institutions receiving further business
  from the state.

  In
  2006, after Congressman A inquired about the status of a $2 million
  grant for the benefit of a publicly-supported school, Blagojevich
  instructed Harris not to release the grant until Blagojevich gave
  further direction, even though Blagojevich previously had agreed to
  support the grant and funds were included in the state’s budget.

  In
  response to inquiries by a high-ranking state official as to whether
  the grant money could be released, Blagojevich informed that official
  that Blagojevich wanted it communicated to Congressman A that the
  congressman's brother needed to have a fundraiser for Blagojevich.

  Blagojevich
  told Lobbyist A that Blagojevich was giving a $2 million grant to a
  school in Congressman A’s district and instructed Lobbyist A to
  approach Congressman A for a fundraiser. After Blagojevich learned
  from Harris that the school had started to incur expenses that were to
  be paid with the grant funds, Blagojevich initially resisted the
  release of the grant money, and ultimately agreed to the release of
  certain grant funds to cover incurred expenses, but only on a delayed
  basis, even though no fundraiser had been held.

  On
  Oct. 8, 2008, defendant Blagojevich advised Lobbyist A that he intended
  to take official action that would provide additional state money to
  Children's Memorial Hospital in Chicago, and that Blagojevich wanted to
  get $50,000 in campaign contributions from the hospital’s chief
  executive officer.

  On
  Oct. 17, 2008, Blagojevich called the hospital’s CEO to tell him of his
  intent to increase the Illinois Medicaid reimbursement rate for
  speciality-care pediatric physicians. Shortly before this, Blagojevich
  had directed Deputy Governor A to initiate such an increase, which
  Illinois providers of pediatric healthcare, including Children’s
  Memorial Hospital, had actively supported for years.

  On
  Oct. 22, 2008, Blagojevich spoke with the Children’s CEO and asked him
  to arrange to raise $25,000 for Blagojevich prior to Jan. 1, 2009. On
  Nov. 12, 2008, after the Children’s CEO had not returned additional
  phone calls from Robert Blagojevich and no political contributions from
  the Children’s CEO or other persons associated with the hospital had
  been received, Blagojevich spoke to Deputy Governor A about the
  increase in the Medicaid reimbursement rates for specialty-care
  pediatric physicians, asking whether “we could pull it back if we
  needed to. . . .” As a result of this conversation, Deputy Governor A
  instructed the Department of Healthcare Services to stop its work on
  increasing the reimbursement for specialty-care pediatric physicians.

  On
  Nov. 13, 2008, Blagojevich told Robert Blagojevich that he wanted
  campaign contributions to be made by the end of the year by Racetrack
  Executive, who, as Blagojevich knew, managed horse racing tracks that
  would financially benefit from a bill pending in the Illinois General
  Assembly that would require certain Illinois casinos to give money to a
  fund that would help the state’s horse racing industry. At that time,
  as Blagojevich knew, Monk had been trying to arrange a contribution
  from Racetrack Executive, and Blagojevich had set a goal of raising
  $100,000 in contributions from and through this individual.

  Blagojevich
  had further conversations with Monk about the horse racing and casino
  bill after it was passed by the state legislature on Nov. 20, 2008.
  Blagojevich and Monk discussed whether and when Blagojevich would sign
  the bill, and whether and when Racetrack Executive would arrange for a
  campaign contribution to Blagojevich. On
  Dec. 3, 2008, Blagojevich indicated to Monk that he was concerned that
  Racetrack Executive would not make a contribution by the end of the
  year if he signed the bill before the contribution was made. As a
  result, Monk and Blagojevich agreed that Monk would speak with
  Racetrack Executive to ensure that he would make a contribution by the
  end of the year.

  After
  meeting with Blagojevich on Dec. 3, 2008, Monk visited Racetrack
  Executive and told him that Blagojevich was concerned that Racetrack
  Executive would not make a contribution to Blagojevich if the bill was
  signed before the contribution was made. After meeting with Racetrack
  Executive, Monk reported to Blagojevich that Monk had said to Racetrack
  Executive, “look, there is a concern that there is going to be some
  skittishness if your bill gets signed because of the timeliness of the
  commitment,” and made it clear to Racetrack Executive that the
  contribution has “got to be in now.” Blagojevich responded, “good” and
  “good job.”

  On
  Dec. 4, 2008, Monk asked Blagojevich to call Racetrack Executive and to
  suggest that Blagojevich would sign the bill, because this would be
  better “from a pressure point of view.” Blagojevich agreed to call
  Racetrack Executive.

  On
  Sept. 18, 2008, Blagojevich, Monk and Robert Blagojevich met with
  Construction Executive, who was both an executive with a company that
  manufactured and distributed road building materials and a
  representative of a road construction trade group. Blagojevich said
  that he was planning on announcing a $1.5 billion road building program
  that would be administered through the Illinois Toll Highway Authority
  and that he might authorize an additional $6 billion road building
  program later on. Blagojevich then asked for Construction Executive’s
  help in raising contributions for Blagojevich’s campaign by the end of
  the year. After Construction Executive left the meeting, Blagojevich
  instructed Monk to try to get Construction Executive to raise $500,000
  in contributions. As Blagojevich knew, Monk later had a series of
  conversations with Construction Executive about the possibility of
  arranging for campaign contributions to Blagojevich.

  On
  Oct. 6, 2008, Blagojevich told Lobbyist A that he would make an
  announcement concerning a $1.8 billion project involving the tollway
  and that Monk would approach Construction Executive to ask that he
  raise substantial campaign contributions. Blagojevich further said
  that he could have announced a larger amount of money for road
  projects, but wanted to see how Construction Executive performed in
  raising contributions, and he added words to the effect of “If they
  don’t perform, [expletive] ‘em.”

  On
  Oct. 22, 2008, approximately one week after Blagojevich publicly
  announced a portion of a $1.8 billion program to upgrade interchanges
  on the tollway system, Blagojevich called Construction Executive, spoke
  with him about the $1.8 billion program, and asked how he was coming
  with fundraising.

  Between
  October and Dec. 9, 2008, Blagojevich, with the assistance of Harris
  and Robert Blagojevich, and others, sought to obtain financial benefits
  for himself and his wife, in return for exercising his duty under
  Illinois law to appoint a United States Senator to fill the vacancy
  created by the election of President Barack Obama.

  Blagojevich
  engaged in numerous conversations with others, at times including
  Harris and Robert Blagojevich, certain high-ranking employees of the
  Office of the Governor, and certain political consultants, to devise
  and set in motion plans by which Blagojevich could use his Senate
  appointment power to obtain financial benefits for himself and his
  wife. At times, Blagojevich directed others, including state
  employees, to assist in these endeavors, including by performing
  research and conveying messages to third parties. Blagojevich and his
  co-schemers devised and discussed obtaining financial benefits in the
  following forms, among others:

  presidential
  appointment of Blagojevich to high-ranking positions in the federal
  government, including Secretary of Health and Human Services or an
  ambassadorship;
  a
  highly-paid leadership position with a private foundation dependent on
  federal aid, which Blagojevich believed could be influenced by the
  President-elect to name Blagojevich to such a position;
  a
  highly-paid leadership position with an organization known as “Change
  to Win,” consisting of seven affiliated labor unions, which, in a
  transaction suggested by Harris, could appoint Blagojevich as its
  chairman with the expectation that the President-elect would assist
  Change to Win with its national legislative agenda;
  employment for Blagojevich’s wife with a union organization, lobbying firm, or on corporate boards of directors;
  a
  highly-paid leadership position with a newly-created, not-for-profit
  corporation which Blagojevich believed could be funded with large
  contributions by persons associated with the President-elect; and
  substantial
  campaign fundraising assistance from individuals seeking the United
  States Senate seat and their backers, including from Senate Candidate
  A, whose associate Blagojevich understood to have offered $1.5 million
  in campaign contributions in return for Blagojevich's appointment of
  Senate Candidate A.

While
expanding the allegations, the 75-page indictment is cast somewhat more
broadly than the 76-page complaint affidavit, which contained excerpts
from court-authorized wiretaps of intercepted conversations that
Blagojevich had with others in both his personal office and a
conference room in the Chicago offices of his campaign fund, Friends of
Blagojevich, located at 4147 North Ravenswood, Suite 300, as well as
over his home telephone.

Friends
of Blagojevich is not a defendant, but, pursuant to the racketeering
count, the indictment seeks forfeiture from Blagojevich of all funds
and assets held at four banks in the name of, or on behalf of, Friends
of Blagojevich. Although Kelly, Monk and Robert Blagojevich at various
times held the post of chairman of Friends of Blagojevich, the
indictment states that fund’s activities and financial affairs at all
times were controlled by Blagojevich personally and the fund operated
for his benefit. The indictment also seeks forfeiture of $188,370 from
Blagojevich as proceeds of the alleged fraud scheme and racketeering
activity, and lists Blagojevich’s apartment in Washington, D.C., and
his Ravenswood Manor home in Chicago as substitute assets.

Separate
counts of racketeering conspiracy and wire fraud contain similar,
overlapping factual allegations. The RICO conspiracy count alleges
that Blagojevich personally, the Office of the Governor of Illinois and
Friends of Blagojevich were associated and, together, constituted the
“Blagojevich Enterprise,” whose primary purpose was to exercise and
preserve power over Illinois government for the financial and political
benefit of Blagojevich, both directly and through Friends of
Blagojevich, and for the financial benefit of his family members and
associates. Blagojevich and Kelly, the only RICO conspiracy
defendants, allegedly conspired with Monk, Cellini, Harris, Robert
Blagojevich, Rezko and previously convicted cooperating defendant
Stuart Levine, to conduct the Blagojevich Enterprise through a pattern
of multiple acts of mail and wire fraud, extortion, attempted extortion
and extortion conspiracy, and state bribery.

As
part of the racketeering conspiracy, Blagojevich allegedly permitted
Kelly and Rezko to exercise substantial influence over certain
gubernatorial activities, as well as state boards and commissions,
knowing that they would use this influence to enrich themselves and
their associates. In return, Kelly and Rezko allegedly benefitted
Blagojevich by generating millions of dollars in campaign contributions
and providing financial benefits directly to Blagojevich and his
family.

The
principle fraud scheme count, which names Blagojevich, Monk, Harris and
Robert Blagojevich as co-schemers, together with Kelly, Cellini, Rezko,
Levine and others, alleges that they deprived the people of Illinois
and the beneficiaries of TRS of the honest services of Blagojevich,
Harris, Monk and Levine, who was a member of the Illinois Health
Facilities Planning Board and the TRS board of trustees.

The
alleged fraud scheme provides the most detailed recitation of the
various factual allegations in the indictment. It alleges that
Blagojevich, Monk, Kelly and Rezko agreed to use Blagojevich’s and
Monk’s offices to divide financial gain among themselves, including the
kickback from the Pension Obligation Bond refinancing. In addition,
the indictment sets forth the following allegations as part of the
fraud scheme:

Maintaining Control over TRS

The Solicitation of Ali Ata

The Solicitation of Joseph Cari


Sometime after October 2003, Rezko told Cari that Rezko had a close
relationship with the Blagojevich administration and a role in picking
consultants, law firms and other entities to get state business, and
that Monk helped implement Rezko’s choices for state work. Rezko said
that the Blagojevich administration would be helpful to Cari’s business
interests in exchange for raising money for Blagojevich.

Campaign Contributions Solicited for TRS Investments

The Attempted Extortion of Capri Capital

Benefits Given to Blagojevich and Monk

The Search for Employment for Blagojevich’s Wife

Attempted Extortion of United States Congressman A

Attempted Extortion of Children’s Memorial Hospital

Attempted Extortion of Racetrack Executive

Attempted Extortion of Highway Contractor

Efforts to Obtain Personal Financial Benefits for Blagojevich

in Return for his Appointment of a United States Senator

Further,
Blagojevich discussed with his co-schemers means by which he could
influence the President-elect to assist him in obtaining personal
benefits for himself and his wife, including by appointing to the
Senate a candidate whom Blagojevich believed to be favored by the
President-elect. At times, Blagojevich attempted to further this goal
by conveying messages, directly and with the assistance of others, to
individuals whom he believed to be in communication with the
President-elect.

On
Dec. 4, 2008, Blagojevich instructed Robert Blagojevich to contact a
representative of Senate Candidate A, and advise the representative
that if Senate Candidate A was going to be chosen to fill the Senate
seat, some of the promised fundraising had to occur before the
appointment. Blagojevich instructed Robert Blagojevich to communicate
the urgency of the message, and to do it in person, rather than over
the phone. Robert Blagojevich agreed to do so, and thereafter arranged
a meeting with an associate of Senate Candidate A.

On
Dec. 5, 2008, following the publication that day of a newspaper article
reporting that Blagojevich had been surreptitiously recorded in
connection with an ongoing federal investigation, Blagojevich
instructed Robert Blagojevich to cancel his meeting with the associate
of Senate Candidate A, and Robert Blagojevich agreed to do so.

The Government is being represented by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Reid Schar, Carrie Hamilton and Christopher Niewoehner.

If
convicted, the maximum penalty for each offense is set forth in the
accompanying chart. The Court, however, would determine the
appropriate sentence to be imposed under the advisory United States
Sentencing Guidelines.

The
public is reminded that an indictment contains only charges and is not
evidence of guilt. The defendants are presumed innocent and are
entitled to a fair trial at which the government has the burden of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, the indictment makes
allegations that Blagojevich at times directed others to take various
actions, but it should not be read to allege that those other persons
carried out those directions unless the indictment specifically alleges
so.